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subs rather than aircraft carriers the
“centerpiece” of its development.
Contributors are generally in agreement
that “hard” evidence about what the
PRC is developing is still rather spotty.
Where evidence is solid the news is
bracing, though hardly surprising. It
suggests that the PLAN is rapidly building and buying naval capabilities with
the concerted aim of deterring the
United States—particularly from action
in the waters surrounding Taiwan—and, in combat, of significantly
damaging American assets. Although
that story pertains to far more than the
proliferation of nuclear submarines, the
book explains how integral China’s
evolving undersea capabilities are to
that mission. Questions remain,
though, about whether the PRC also intends its submarines to be deployed as
part of a strategic retaliatory force—a
far more menacing, though equally unsurprising, ambition.
Threaded throughout this volume is a
debate about what Beijing’s increasingly
assertive maritime doctrine means for
the United States. While some contributors make evident the colossal technical and operational obstacles that the
PLAN still faces in mastering the arts of
submarine warfare, others caution
against complacency. Andrew Erickson
and Lyle Goldstein assert that Beijing’s
program to develop nuclear submarines
may offer “one of the best single indicators of whether or not China has ambitions to become a genuine global
military power.” Rear Admiral Michael
McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret.), observes
that although the PRC is taking considerable strides toward the implementation of a more robust maritime strategy and appears to have the economic
resources to continue along that path,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

BOOK REVIEWS

135

the United States also has the resources
to maintain its formidable advantages
over an evolving PLAN, if Washington
remains determined to use them for
that purpose.
ALAN WACHMAN

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

Walton, C. Dale. Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: Multipolarity and
the Revolution in Strategic Perspective. New York:
Routledge, 2007. 160pp. $125

C. Dale Walton, PhD, is a lecturer at
the University of Reading, in the United
Kingdom, specializing in strategic studies and foreign policy.
Over the past half-century the field of
geopolitical studies has been void of
scholarly works at the (Sir Halford)
Mackinder and (Nicholas) Spykman
level of inquiry. However, Walton’s
Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the
Twenty-first Century is a work of such
foresight and ambition that it just
might stand in such company. Unlike
most of his fellow classical realists, who
tend to limit their prescriptive endeavors to sensible warnings—or at best
general policy recommendations—
Walton pushes the prescriptive and predictive potential of history to its limit
(in some cases possibly over the limit)
as he uses history to formulate specific
strategic guidelines for the making of
policy in the future. Walton effectively
merges the lessons from the past with
the post–Cold War political, demographic, technological, and cultural patterns to explain the most likely
geopolitical context of the near future.
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Walton’s message is quite simple: although it is hard to predict the future, it
is possible to locate some trends that
will heavily shape the future environment of international politics and that,
combined with what we know about the
past, will present useful criteria on what
we should expect to witness in the future. His warning is also clear that security communities that “understand,
accept, and encourage” such changes
will have an advantage over those that
do not. His two main arguments are,
first, that eastern Eurasia will replace
Europe as the most geopolitically important area of the world, an arena in
which strategic competition will take
place in a multipolar environment created by the rise of minor powers and
the decline of major ones (especially the
United States); and second, that the
rapid pace of technological advancements will likely produce another “revolution in military affairs” of such
significance that its importance will be
second only to the ability of security
communities to undergo a “revolution
in strategic perspective” (RSP) that allows them to adapt effectively to the
changing security environment.
Because much of the book focuses on
the future role of technology and its
likely impact on warfare, at times it appears as though Walton has abandoned
classical realism and become a
technophiliac futurist. He warns that
the American proclivity for allowing
moral issues to blur strategic clarity
could prevent it from embracing the
RSP. This theme, while pervading,
tends to get lost in the discussions
about technology—one of the very few
flaws in this work. Also, Walton tends
to speculate in depth about the potential of biotechnology, nanotechnology,
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and computer science but pays little attention to the likelihood that the future
will witness an increase in competition
over the strategic exploitation of space.
Nonetheless, he more than makes up
for these slight flaws with his
thought-provoking geopolitical
analysis.
Walton argues that the “Columbian Epoch” actually ended in 1991, and not at
the beginning of the twentieth century
as Mackinder argued. Although he delivers a sharp critique of the great British geographer, Walton actually
endorses Mackinder’s reasoning, recognizing that Mackinder got much more
right than he did wrong and that his
Heartland Theory still serves as the
most useful guide for geopolitical
analysis.
Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the
Twenty-first Century should be mandatory reading for all American students
of geopolitics. One should expect that
military schools and other institutions
of higher learning in Asia will certainly
embrace its message, particularly as it is
given by a Westerner who attempts in a
reasonable and persuasive manner to
make the connection between Asia’s
rise and history’s geopolitical patterns.
Although many of Walton’s predictions
are speculative, he has surely succeeded
in constructing a new framework for
students of geopolitics. Few will argue
with his choice of questions, but ideally
his answers will spark a much-needed
high-level debate about the future path
of geopolitics and strategy. A work like
this invites challenges, but the gauntlet
that Walton has thrown down will provide no easy opportunities for dissent. I
would suspect that like Mackinder,
Walton will be one of a very small
group of strategists who in their
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attempts to anticipate the patterns of
future strategic history will be more
right than wrong.
STEPHEN B. SMITH

University of Reading
United Kingdom

Schleifer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and
Military Strategies. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic, 2006. 272pp. $69.50

In the wake of the second Palestinian
intifada against Israel (2002 through
2006), it has been easy to lose sight of
the fact that the first intifada (December 1987 through October 1991) was
largely nonviolent but highly successful.
It achieved the primary goal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO)—forcing Israel to recognize the
PLO by initiating negotiations. In this
work Ron Schleifer offers a unique,
though logically flawed, perspective of
the first intifada, which he describes as
“political warfare.” That is, he examines
how the PLO assumed control of what
began as a spontaneous nonviolent uprising in December 1987 to produce a
successful campaign that was based on a
range of largely persuasive techniques
and lasted more than three years.
Schleifer analyzes the successful Palestinian tactics and compares them to the
unsuccessful Israeli response through
the components of “psychological operations” (PSYOP) as presented in the
U.S. Army Manual of Psychological
Warfare.
Schleifer’s book is based on research
gathered for his doctoral dissertation
completed at the University of Leeds.
He chose the PSYOP manual and its
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taxonomy as his theoretical basis, and
he is at his best when using the components of the PSYOP manual to analyze
and compare how both sides prepared
their campaigns, determined and applied consistent themes or messages,
chose and used dissemination techniques and tactics, responded to enemy
messages, and applied countermeasures. He offers convincing evidence
that within the first few weeks of the
uprising, the PLO seized and maintained the initiative and dominated
what we now call “the information environment,” while the Israelis, riven by
internal ambiguity and dissent,
floundered.
Unfortunately, this work is ultimately
unsatisfying, because its organization
and thesis have logical flaws. Readers
interested in a more concise, better organized analysis of nonviolent conflict
based on psychological operations can
find it in Schleifer’s 2006 article “Psychological Operations: A New Variation
of an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” published in Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, volume 29, pp. 1–19. For
readers interested in the specific tactics
used in the first intifada, this book will
serve as a high-quality resource. This
work has several critical shortcomings,
one of them its title. A better title might
have focused on the key concept and
not the methods. Second, although he
thoroughly reviews how “propaganda”
and “psychological operations” acquired their negative connotations before and after World War II, Schleifer
applies only a restrictive definition of
PSYOP. The PSYOP manual, however,
uses a different primary definition and
categorizes different types. He analyzes
a complete taxonomy in terms of his
own different, limited, definition.
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